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ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
DOMESTIC RELATIONS--CONFLICT OF LAWS--FULL FAITH AND
CREDIT CLAus.-Petitioner, in a New York court, seeks a surviving
spouse's statutory share in the decedent's estate 1 against a testamen-
tary provision which named the respondent as the sole legatee. The
respondent, decedent's daughter by a former wife, claims that the
petitioner's marriage to the decedent was ineffective; and supports
this claim by a collateral attack on the validity of her deceased father's
Florida divorce, obtained prior to his marriage to the petitioner. The
undisputed facts show that the divorce was obtained by a fraud com-
mitted against the Florida court since the complainant in the action
had failed to fulfill the jurisdictional residence requirement.2 Dece-
dent appeared in the divorce proceedings and had full opportunity
to litigate all the issues. However, he chose to contest only the merits
of the action, and failed to question the allegations as to residence.
A finding of jurisdiction was made and the divorce granted. Held,
judgment for respondent reversed. The validity of the Florida di-
vorce may not be questioned in New York. The full faith and credit
clause 3 bars collateral attack on the divorce decree of a sister state
by any person unable to attack the decree in the courts of the state
of rendition. Since respondent was barred by Florida law from at-
tacking the decree in that state,4 her attack will not be permitted
elsewhere in the Union. Johnson v. Muelberger, 71 Sup. Ct. 474
(1951), reversing Matter of Johnson, 301 N. Y. 13, 92 N. E. 2d
44 (1950).
Migratory divorce decrees and their complex consequences have
long occupied the attention of the bar and the public generally. The
importance of such decrees can hardly be overemphasized since they
directly affect some of society's most basic relationships. The marital
status of the parties and their rights to support, by way of alimony
or separate maintenance, are among the circumstances which may be
altered by the foreign courts' action. Collateral attacks are frequently
brought in jurisdictions other than the one rendering the decree to
determine the precise effect of these divorces on such relationships.
1 N. Y. DECEDENT ESTATE LAW § 18.
2"In order to obtain a divorce the complainant must have resided ninety
days in the State of Florida before the filing of the bill of complaint." FLA.
STAT. ANN. § 65.02.
3 U. S. CONST. Art. IV, § 1. "Full Faith and Credit shall be given in each
State to the public Acts, Records, and Judicial Proceedings of every other
State." 62 STAT. 947, 28 U. S. C. § 1738 (1948). "Such Acts, records and judi-
cial proceedings . . .shall have the same full faith and credit in every court
within the United States ... as they have by law or usage in the courts of
such State... from which they are taken."
4 The Court found that Florida decisions permit collateral attack only by
those strangers to the action having a pre-existing interest at the time of the
rendition of the decree. If respondent were considered a stranger to the action,
she could not attack the judgment since she had a mere expectancy in decedent's
estate at time of divorce. Persons in privity with the immediate parties would




The success of such attacks promises to be increasingly restricted by
the continued invocation of the full faith and credit clause.
"Under our system of law, judicial power to grant a divorce
• . . is founded on domicile." 5 Acquisition of a bona fide domicile
by the petitioner is essential to give the court jurisdiction to grant
a divorce entitled to full faith and credit. Failure of the defending
spouse to participate in the action does not vary this rule.6 A finding
of jurisdiction in an ex parte proceeding will not prevent other states
from inquiring into the existence of domicile in the rendering forum.
7
But, when both parties appear and actively litigate the jurisdictional
facts, then, as to them, the court's findings are res judicata.8 Full
opportunity 9 to litigate the jurisdictional issues, even though not
availed of, binds the parties as conclusively as an actual contest. If
the immediate parties either contest the action or have the oppor-
tunity to do so, they will be barred from collaterally attacking a di-
vorce decree on jurisdictional grounds, except when such attack is
permitted in the courts of the divorce state.10
The principal case greatly broadens the rule that collateral at-
tacks are allowed only when the divorce state permits. This doctrine
no longer binds merely the immediate parties but now may be equally
applicable to persons who were neither personally before the divorce
tribunal nor under the court's jurisdiction." The divorce forum has
the power to determine the identity of the persons who will be sub-
ject to their decree, and to fix the circumstances under which the con-
clusiveness of their decrees will apply. Any attempt to forecast the
methods by which the states will seek to extend the res judicata effect
of their judgments would be largely conjectural. It would seem how-
ever that the "nature of interest" test illustrated here will be sup-
plemented, if necessary, by other restrictive devices, possibly of an
evidential or procedural nature. The cumulative burden imposed on
5 Frankfurter, J., in Williams v. North Carolina, 325 U. S. 226, 229 (1945),
citing Bell v. Bell, 181 U. S. 175 (1901), and Andrews v. Andrews, 188 U. S.
14 (1903).
"Williams v. North Carolina, 317 U. S. 287 (1942).
7Williams v. North Carolina, 325 U. S. 226 (1945).8 Davis v. Davis, 305 U. S. 32 (1938).
9 "Full opportunity" is afforded those persons who either personally appear
or who are personally served within the state awarding the divorce decree, even
though the jurisdictional facts are not actually litigated. Note, 48 CoL. L. Rlv.
1083, 1085 (1948).
10 Sherrer v. Sherrer, 334 U. S. 343 (1948); Coe v. Coe, 334 U. S. 378(1948).
11 Support for the instant holding seems to be reasonably found in the fol-
lowing dicta: "It is one thing to recognize as permissible the judicial re-
examination of findings of jurisdictional fact where such findings have been
made by a court of a sister State which has entered a divorce decree in ex
parte proceedings. It is quite another thing to hold that the vital rights and
interests involved in divorce litigation may be held in suspense pending the
scrutiny by courts of sister States of findings of jurisdictional fact . . .
Sherrer v. Sherrer, 334 U. S. 343, 355-356 (1948).
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a would-be attacker by the states' actions might conceivably termi-
nate all future effective litigation of this nature.
The Court, by its immediate application of the full faith and
credit clause to a decree rendered after a finding of jurisdiction, has
avoided disturbing directly the domicile theory of divorce jurisdic-
tion.' 2 However, since ". . . the decree of divorce is a conclusive
adjudication of everything except the jurisdictional facts upon which
it is founded . . . ," I collateral attacks are made on the jurisdic-
tional facts which include domicile. The limitation placed on the
right to bring such attacks, after contested hearings, has an important
practical effect on the domicile rule. For collateral attack purposes,
the rule no longer states that the domicile of the petitioner must be
bona fide. It apparently has been modified to read domicile of the
petitioner in the foreign state must be bona fide only as to those per-
sons and under such circumstances as the divorce state dictates. As
to all others, the finding or assumption of jurisdiction is conclusive.
This limitation on the right to collateral attack can only be an invi-
tation to consent divorce, sham proceedings, perjury and collusion.
It is also unfortunately an invitation to those states offering what are
called "bargain counter" divorces, to restrict, by legislation or deci-
sion, as much as is constitutionally possible, the opportunities for
collateral attack elsewhere.
It remains unanswered, however, whether the state of matri-
monial domicile may be precluded from itself attacking the jurisdic-
tional findings in a contested action held in a foreign state (e.g., in
a criminal prosecution for adultery). The majority of the Court
again 14 evidently limit this right of the home state to situations where
the defending spouse has not participated in the action. They there-
fore limit the traditional view that the state has an immediate vital
interest in the preservation of the marital relationship of its domi-
ciliaries. 15 If we accept the theory that the state is an interested party
12 Goomici, CoxrFicr oF LAWS § 127 (3d ed. 1949) discussing the Sherrer
and Coe cases said: "Certainly the general principle involved... [res judicata]
. . . does not detract from the proposition that divorce jurisdiction is not a
personal matter to be conferred by the consent of the parties for it is clear
that under the William. holding domicile of at least one of the parties in the
state where the divorce is sought is necessary in order that the marital status
may be properly put in issue." It would seem that this comment has appli-
cability here.
13 Frankfurter, J., in Williams v. North Carolina, 325 U. S. 226, 232 (1945).
14 The Court in the instant case found Williams v. North Carolina, 325 U. S.
226 (1945), held: ". . . a sister state [is] free to determine whether there was
domicile of one party in an 'ex parte' proceeding so as to give the court juris-
diction to enter a decree."
5" ... . the State has an interest in the family relations of its citizens vastly
different from the interest it has in an ordinary commercial transaction. That
interest cannot be bartered or bargained away by the immediate parties to the
controversy by a default or an arranged contest in a proceeding for divorce in
a State to which the parties are strangers." Frankfurter, J., dissenting in
Sherrer v. Sherrer, 334 U. S. 343, 358 (1948). Dissent repeated in Coe v.
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only when the hearings are ex parte, and apply the Florida law which
permits attack only by persons with pre-existing interests,' 6 it ap-
pears that jurisdictional findings in contested Florida actions may not
thereafter be re-examined by other sister states. All states could
adopt the Florida rule and then ". . . a court's record would estab-
lish its power and the power would be proved by the record." 17 It
is submitted, however, that the state's interest in the marriage status
of its citizens is of paramount importance both in ex parte and con-
tested hearings. It cannot be within the power of the parties to cut
off the interest which society, represented by the state, has in the
marriage. This must be true, especially when that society may later
be called upon to provide support, educational facilities and many
other benefits.
The Court, in the principal case, was completely aware that the
complainant in the divorce action had deceived the Florida court as
to her domicile. Yet the Court chose to ignore the fraud because the
present respondent was not a party entitled to attack the decree in
courts of the rendering state. The effect of this policy is to validate
by use of the full faith and credit clause a decree rendered by a state
without jurisdiction and to shield fraudulent acts committed against
the tribunal. The Court might well have declined to ". . . infuse
constitutional virility into the judgment of a court . . . which has
been deliberately deceived in proceeding to judgment in a cause over
which ... it had no jurisdiction." 1
The present case points up the increasing role which res judicata
will play in future divorce litigation. Unquestionably it will con-
tribute greatly to the certainty of the status of divorced persons. All
parties interested in the decree, directly or indirectly, may now ascer-
tain their rights and duties under it to an extent heretofore impos-
sible. This undoubted socially beneficial result unhappily offers an
inducement to a state to preclude other sovereignties and persons
justifiably entitled to relief from the right of collateral attack. It is
not presumptuous to assume that a state making a business out of
granting divorces will act to eliminate all collateral attack rights not
constitutionally protected. Nor is it presumptuous to assume that
the public generally will become a bigger customer of the "bargain
counter" divorce.
Coe, 334 U. S. 378 (1948). Sherrer case dissent referred to in dissent in in-
stant case.
16 See note 4 supra.
17 Williams v. North Carolina, 325 U. S. 226, 234 (1945).
-1 Staedler v. Staedler, 6 N. J. 380, 78 A. 2d 896, 901 (1951).
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